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Examining the accounts of oil spills crises in Nigeria through sensegiving and defensive 
behaviours
Abstract
Purpose: The paper examines how oil multinational companies (MNCs) in Nigeria framed 
accounts to dissociate themselves from causing oil spills.  
Design/methodology/approach: We utilised data from relevant corporate reports, external 
accounts and interviews, and used sensegiving with defensive behaviours theoretical framing 
to explore corporate narratives aimed at altering stakeholders’ perceptions.
Findings: The corporations gave sense to their audience by invoking scapegoating blame 
avoidance narrative in attributing the cause of most oil spills in Nigeria to outsiders 
(sabotage), despite potentially misclassifying the sabotage-corrosion dichotomy. Corporate 
stance was reinforced through justifying narrative, which suggested that multi-stakeholders 
jointly determined the causes of oil spills, thus portraying corporate accounts as transparent, 
credible and objective. 
Practical implications: With compensation to oil spills’ victims only legally permitted for non-
sabotage-induced spills alongside the burden of proof on the victims, the MNCs are 
incentivised to attribute most oil spills to sabotage. On policy implication, accountability 
would be best served when the MNCs are tasked both with the burden of proof and a 
responsibility to demonstrate their transparency in preventing oil spills, including those 
caused by sabotage. 
Research implications: The socio-political dynamics in an empirical setting affect corporate 
accounts and how those accounts appear persuasive, implying that such contextual factors 
merit consideration when evaluating corporate accounts. For example, despite contradictions 
in corporate accounts, corporate attribution of oil spills to external factors appeared 
persuasive due to the inherently complicated socio-political dynamics. 
Originality/value: Crisis situations generate multiple and competing perspectives, but 
sensegiving and defensive behaviours lenses enrich our understanding of how crisis-ridden 
companies frame narratives to alter stakeholders’ perceptions.  Accounts-giving therefore 
partly satisfies accountability demands, and acts as sensegiving signals aimed at 
reframing/redefining existing perceptions.
Keywords: Social and environmental narratives and accountability; oil spills; sensegiving; 
blame avoidance defensive behaviours; multinational oil corporations; Nigeria.
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1 Introduction     
Prior studies have examined corporate disclosures in relation to oil spills, particularly 
the British Petroleum (BP) Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010 (Arora and Lodhia, 2017; Botes and 
Samkin, 2013; Helflin and Wallace, 2017; Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012) and Exxon Valdez 
oil spill of 1989 (Deegan et al., 2000; Patten, 1992; Walden and Schwartz, 1997). Incidentally, 
both incidents occurred in the US. While they have attracted public criticisms, the corporate 
narratives associated with them have also generated scholarly commentaries.  Similar 
incidents are a commonplace in Nigeria, yet the examination of the attendant corporate 
disclosures has not received the deserved research attention. This research focuses on Nigeria 
due to its unique long history of perennial and widespread oil spills with pervasive negative 
social and environmental impacts, which earned Nigeria the tag of the global capital of oil 
pollution (BBC, 2010). Oil multinational corporations (MNCs) whose operations are linked to 
this pollution, like in other countries, have come under intense criticisms resulting in a myriad 
of corporate disclosures (Buccina et al., 2013; Egbon et al., 2018; Pupovac and Meorman, 
2017).  However, the uniqueness of oil spills in Nigeria relates to their regularity, widespread 
as well as the contestation and blame game that follow them. Given this uniqueness and  the 
accountability tension created by the blame game, we consider it important to explore 
corporate accounts on oil spill incidents in Nigeria, which are not only perennial in occurrence 
with pervasive negative environmental impacts but also highly contested (Denedo et al., 
2018, 2019; European Parliament, 2011; Pupovac and Meorman, 2017). The blame game has 
its root in the fact those oil spills have been caused by internal (corporate) and external (third 
party) factors, but the actual proportion caused by each factor is masked by ambiguity.  Such 
ambiguity creates the tension for a blame game, which has both policy and practical 
implications. For example, oil spills have largely stimulated corporate-community conflicts in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Babatunde, 2020), particularly as the alleged causes 
determine whether the victims are entitled to compensation (Adewale, 1989). Moreover, the 
contentious nature of oil spills in Nigeria has had implications for the discharge of the related 
responsibility and accountability.     
While prior studies on corporate accounts involving oil spill incidents have largely 
focused on one-off incidents (Arora and Lodhia, 2017; Botes and Samkin, 2013; Deegan et al., 
2000; Helflin and Wallace, 2017; Patten, 1992; Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012; Walden and 
Schwartz, 1997), this study focuses on a context where oil spills regularly occur. Recurring oil 
spills create negative environmental impacts and instigate negative perceptions from 
stakeholders towards the indicted companies. Following the contestation surrounding the 
recurring and pervasive oil spill incidents in Nigeria, the purpose of this paper is to explore 
how oil multinational companies (MNCs) in Nigeria strategically framed accounts to dissociate 
themselves from causing the oil spills by reframing the general view that the oil spills are 
caused by the negligent acts of the oil companies. Such strategically redefined or reframed 
narratives are apparently intended to manage stakeholders’ perceptions and deflect negative 
consequences in relation to the causes of the oil spills.  In framing the nature of corporate 
accountability in relation to the alarming corporation-linked oil spill environmental crisis in 
Nigeria, this paper adopted the lenses of sensegiving and blame avoidance defensive 
behaviours to examine how the MNCs employ narratives to favourably alter stakeholders’ 
perceptions on the contested causes of oil spills.  Boin et al. (2009), for example, argue that 
crisis usually generates narratives and counter-narratives in relation to its severity, causes, 
responsibility for its occurrence, while those contesting it struggle to impose their views as 
the dominant narratives. Sensegiving lens thus provides an understanding within the contexts 
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of crisis and change (Drori and Ellis, 2011; Gilstrap et al., 2016; Levine Daniel and Eckerd, 2019) 
as companies adopt sensegiving mode of communication during crises (Wehmeier and 
Schultz, 2011). As negative corporate incidents naturally provoke negative public reactions, 
companies are under pressure to mobilise defensive accounts as strategic tools to avoid 
blame and to favourably alter stakeholders’ perceptions. While companies frame their 
narratives to persuade their audience about a reality, their accounts are only a partial 
representation of that reality (Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Moerman and van der Laan, 2015; 
Tregidga, 2017). Consequently, the paper draws on corporate accounts, independent external 
accounts and interviews to provide multiple perspectives on the causes of oil spills in Nigeria 
(Gray, 2013; Parker, 2008) with the aim of balancing views and spotting gaps in the corporate 
accounts (Adams, 2004; Dey, 2003; Ruffing, 2007; Tregidga, 2017).     
We adopt a qualitative case study approach with a focus on the big-five oil MNCs 
(Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total) in Nigeria whose operations have been largely 
linked to the oil spill incidents.  The perennial and widespread nature of the oil spills warrants 
the calls to hold these companies accountable for their actions and impacts (Belal et al., 2013; 
Buccina et al., 2013). Whereas oil spills, gas flaring and waste discharge are the principal 
pollution of oil companies in Nigeria, oil spills are highly controversial as they potentially 
originate from sabotage (actions of third parties) and corporate negligence (European 
Parliament, 2011). In Nigeria, these two broad causes of oil spills have serious implications for 
their control and elimination, as well as determining who is culpable, responsible and 
accountable for them. Consequently, corporate and external stakeholders’ narratives have 
centred on what/who causes the oil spills and who should be held accountable for them. Such 
controversy and the attendant public perceptions portend legitimacy threat for the 
implicated oil companies (Bebbington et al., 2008; Pupovac and Moerman, 2017).  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the causes of oil spills and the attendant clean-up 
and environmental remediation are predominantly the dual subjects of oil spill controversy 
in Nigeria (Egbon et al., 2018; UNEP, 2011), but we have focused on the narratives involving 
the causes of oil spills for two reasons. First, the exacerbated controversy of how many oil 
spills are caused by corporate actions or sabotage largely fuels the perennial corporate-
community conflicts vis-à-vis agitations regarding compensation.  Second, it will provide 
insights on the ambiguity surrounding the causes of oil spills in Nigeria and the implications 
for accountability. As such, the paper provides insights on the accountability practices of 
environmentally sensitive industries in developing economies – specifically Nigeria, where the 
environmental pollution is both perennial and pervasive. From the empirical analysis, the 
corporations gave sense to their audience by invoking scapegoating blame avoidance 
narrative in attributing the cause of most oil spills in Nigeria to outsiders (sabotage), despite 
potentially misclassifying the sabotage-corrosion dichotomy. Corporate stance has been 
reinforced through justifying narrative, which suggested that the causes of oil spills were 
jointly determined by multi-stakeholders, thus portraying the corporate accounts as 
transparent, credible and objective. This study contributes to the wider literature of corporate 
accountability through the lenses of sensegiving and defensive behaviours to provide insights 
on how multiple corporations employ blame avoidance narratives to influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions in the face of detestable outcomes or incidents. More specifically, it contributes 
to prior studies on corporate disclosures involving oil spill incidents by extending the level of 
resolution beyond a single company to multiple corporations which have contemporaneously 
mobilised strategic narratives as persuasive signals to influence stakeholders’ perceptions 
over recurring negative incidents.  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We provide a review of corporate 
disclosures involving negative incidents and then discuss the analytical lenses of sensegiving 
and defensive behaviours. Next, we discuss the data and methods and then present the 
analysis of empirical evidence followed by the discussion of findings. Finally, we provide some 
concluding remarks.
2 Review of prior studies on corporate disclosures on major negative incidents
Several studies have examined corporate disclosures with respect to two major US oil 
spills following widespread media coverage. These oil spill incidents widely covered by prior 
studies are the British Petroleum (BP) Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010 (Arora and Lodhia, 2017; 
Botes and Samkin, 2013; Helflin and Wallace, 2017; Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012) and 
Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 (Deegan et al., 2000; Patten, 1992; Walden and Schwartz, 1997). 
While those incidents attracted public criticisms, the narratives associated with them have 
generated scholarly commentaries.  But oil spills in Nigeria are both a commonplace and 
household phenomenon in the Niger Delta communities where they occur, which makes BBC 
(2010) to nickname Nigeria as the global capital of oil pollution. Hence, the corporate 
narratives in connection with the widespread oil spills in the fragile Niger Delta wetland 
deserve in-depth investigation especially as the indicted corporations are still able to carry on 
their operations with impunity. This paper is thus designed to explore an important aspect of 
the oil spill debacle in Nigeria, particularly the narratives relating to its controvertible causes. 
Primarily, this section reviews prior studies on oil spill incidents to provide context for the 
paper and its contribution to the voluntary disclosure and accountability literature.
Botes and Samkin (2013) examined BP’s communicative posture in dealing with the 
legitimacy crisis and stakeholders’ criticisms instigated by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. They 
argued that BP employed different strategically compelling narratives to manage the 
perceptions of its stakeholders because of the potentially damaging consequences the crisis 
generated. Such tactics (apologia) included denial, counterattack, differentiation and 
apology, which enabled the company to partly shift their blame (see Botes and Samkin, 2013 
for detailed discussion). More recently also, Arora and Lodhia (2017) examined how BP 
deployed social and environmental disclosures to manage its reputation risk associated with 
the Gulf of Mexico oil spill crisis. Drawing on reputation risk management, they observed that 
BP actively used its website to disclose social and environmental information to manage the 
crisis by deploying different image restoration strategies due to the potentially damaging 
impact of the crisis on its reputation (Bebbington et al., 2008; Benoit, 1997).  Both studies 
suggest that the oil spill posed reputational and legitimacy threats to the company, which 
instigated corporate narratives to alter stakeholders’ adverse perceptions and reactions. 
Also, Summerhays and de Villiers (2012) examined whether the BP oil spill engendered 
increased disclosures in the annual reports of other large companies in the oil industry 
because of its potential legitimacy threat on the industry. By evaluating the companies against 
three disclosure strategies (image enhancement, disclaimer and deflection), they find 
evidence that the companies increased their environmental disclosures, mostly positive 
disclosures compared to neutral or negative ones, as an image enhancement strategy to 
enable them to regain threatened legitimacy. Investors may negatively react to companies 
that fail to disclose more environmental information (although the information may be 
symbolic rather than substantive) in the industry that experienced a disaster because of the 
perceived future disaster costs and potential exposure to greater regulatory risk (see Heflin 
and Wallace, 2017). Deegan et al. (2000) also find evidence of corporations making more 
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voluntary information disclosures in their annual reports following a disaster incident linked 
to a company within their industries compared to periods preceding the incident. As Exxon 
Valdez incident was one of the incidents explored by Deegan et al. (2000), and similar to 
Summerhays and de Villiers (2012; see also Patten, 1992), they find evidence that companies 
in the Australian oil industry increased their environmental information disclosure after the 
Exxon Valdez incident in the US. 
Other studies have equally examined growth in corporate disclosures following 
negative incidents. For example, Coetzee and van Staden (2011) find increase in disclosures 
by large mining firms in South Africa following mining accidents in reaction to legitimacy 
threat. Similarly, Walden and Schwatz (1997) examine changes in corporate environmental 
disclosures in four industries after Exxon Valdez oil spill and they find increased 
environmental disclosures across the four industries. With empirical evidence suggesting that 
companies operating in the same industry (including other comparably sensitive industries) 
will increase their environmental disclosures due to the perceived legitimacy threat when one 
of them caused a major negative environmental incident, it is realistic to expect the 
implicated company to provide greater information in relation to the incident as its legitimacy 
is apparently more threatened. In Nigeria where oil spills are widespread and recurring, the 
companies whose operations are linked to them will feel more pressured to alter their 
stakeholders’ perceptions in their favour given the incidents’ media publicity. However, the 
focus of this study is not on the amount of disclosure, but on the strategic use of persuasive 
disclosures to alter stakeholders’ perceptions. 
Following wide media coverage given to environmental crises (Deegan et al., 2000), 
stakeholders are likely to react negatively towards the companies linked to those crises. For 
example, Carberry et al. (2018, p. 121) argue that “investors will be more likely to react 
negatively to misconduct when the media focuses more attention on it, and presents clear 
and credible information that misconduct occurred, that the firm was responsible for it, and 
that it was the result of deeper organizational problems.” This scenario increases the pressure 
on such companies to provide their side of the story. Hence, companies linked to an 
environmental disaster increase their disclosure of positive news following the crisis to 
enhance how stakeholders view them (Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012). Due to the 
negative consequences people may suffer for being linked to a discredited phenomenon, they 
are incentivised to use evidence to distance themselves from it. For example, Detzen and 
Hoffman (2018) demonstrate how two eminent German academics use narratives with 
accumulated evidence to dissociate themselves from the stigmatised Nazi Regime following 
the World War II because of how it would negatively affect them.
Furthermore, Pupovac and Moerman (2017) examine Shell’s hybrid account, a 
response letter, which demonstrates how the company uses self-account as a rhetorical 
accountability device in relation to oil spill in its Nigeria’s operations.  Underlying the 
company’s narrative is the portrayal of itself as a responsible entity (Nwagbara and Belal, 
2019) that manages the oil spill incidents with the associated curtailment, clean up, 
compensation payments to victims and environmental remediation in Nigeria.  
When organisations know that stakeholders expect environmentally responsible 
behaviour from them, they tend to align their narratives to make them look so to their 
audience (Cho et al., 2018). Increasingly, corporations use social and environmental 
accounting (SEA) reports in the public domain to formally communicate to or dialogue with 
their shareholders and other stakeholders (Botes and Samkin, 2013; Cho et al., 2018; Du and 
Vieira, 2012; Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). Specifically, companies use channels such as 
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news media, websites, corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, sustainability reports, 
etc. to disseminate their accounts (Du and Vieira, 2012). These accounts can be as persuasive 
tools to control the conversation involving controversial crises such as oil spills. Prior studies 
have shown that companies can use SEA reports to project a good self-image before their 
audience (Bebbington et al., 2008) and control the conversation (Livesey and Kearins, 2002; 
Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). Hence, this paper’s focus on oil spill environmental crisis in 
Nigeria to explore how the oil MNCs strategically manage their stakeholders’ perceptions and 
forestall negative reactions by framing narratives to dissociate themselves from causing the 
widespread oil spills.  
3 Theoretical frameworks 
Contestations surround the perennial oil spills linked to the operations of oil MNCs in 
Nigeria, thus meriting a research examining how these MNCs strategically frame accounts to 
dissociate themselves from causing the oil spills by reframing the general perception that 
corporate negligence was to blame. With insight from Horbach et al. (2019) and Ploeger and 
Bisel (2013), the corporations’ strategically reframed or (re)created narratives aimed at 
influencing stakeholders’ perceptions and deflecting negative consequences accompanying 
negative incidents are engendered to give sense to the stakeholders by the instrumentality 
of defensive communicative strategies. In our study, giving sense and mobolising defensive 
communicative strategies are pivotal for the corporations in reframing or recreating the 
images stakeholders have of them due to the oil spill incidents. As such, we adopt the 
sensegiving lens to explore the case companies’ use of narratives to influence the perceptions 
of their audience as the companies dissociate themselves from causing most of the 
widespread oil spills linked to their operations. We equally draw on blame avoidance 
defensive behaviours by Ashforth and Lee (1990) to frame and tease out how the implicated 
companies mobilise accounts in a sensegiving fashion to manage stakeholders’ negative 
perceptions and douse the attendant blame arising from oil spills. We now discuss these 
lenses in turn.
3.1 Sensegiving
van Halderen et al. (2016) consider sengegiving as a tactic companies use to manage 
the impression of stakeholders to attenuate stakeholder pressures over corporate social and 
environmental responsibility.  It is also perceived as a strategy companies facing increasing 
stakeholder pressures deploy in a sense of clarifying somewhat ‘confused’ narratives and 
asserting their preferred position (van Halderen et al., 2016). When companies have 
preferred perspectives of an event, they give sense to manage corporate identity and key 
resource providers (Levine Daniel and Eckerd, 2019; van Halderen et al., 2016) to make the 
key stakeholders perceive and interpret the event in those preferred ways (Søderberg, 2003).  
Against this backdrop, sensegiving involves “the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442). Sonenshein (2010) also posits 
that sensegiving is when narrative is deployed to influence others. Thus, to give sense can be 
construed as “the symbolic constructions used to create meaning for others” (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 446). In this regard, sensegiving acts as a form of negotiation process 
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whereby actors try to ‘sell’ or enact their vision or intended reality to others in the context of 
crisis or change. 
Stakeholders’ perceptions regarding an issue can be altered when sensegiving is 
enacted. According to Drori and Ellis (2011, p. 2), “the act of sensegiving involves selecting 
and applying rhetoric, conversational and narrative strategies that reflect an attempt …  to 
shape cognitive, cultural-symbolic and action.” Corporate narratives can thus evoke cognitive 
and social biases in that sensegiving is an active process by which actors strategically frame 
narratives to influence the perceptions of others (Arvidsson and Johansson, 2019; Levine 
Daniel and Eckerd, 2019; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). As sensegiving is deployed in strategic 
change or crisis situation (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Levine Daniel and Eckerd, 2019), we 
draw on it to focus the paper’s examination of corporate narratives on oil spills which are 
serious environmental crisis oil MNCs face in Nigeria coupled with the ambiguity surrounding 
their causes, and their potential to induce negative inferences and consequences from 
corporate stakeholders (particularly investors). 
Firms use corporate report to give sense to their relevant stakeholders to change the 
inferences they make about the organisation (Jain and Prakash, 2017). Hence, organisations 
deploy sensegiving as a signalling mode during strategic change or crisis event with the aim 
to disrupt the status quo and reframe the existing perceptions (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). 
In our empirical setting, the case companies would rationally enlist sensegiving with the aim 
to disrupt the general view that the recurring oil spills in Nigeria are caused by corporate 
negligence and influence stakeholders’ perceptions to align with corporate frame, particularly 
in maintaining shareholder-centric ideology. As Arvidsson and Johansson (2019, p. 86) argue, 
“sense-giving is provided in a cognitive frame, i.e. an interpretative scheme … aimed to agree 
with the followers’ interest, values and beliefs as well as organizational activities, goals and 
ideology.” Companies thus mobilise sensegiving as a strategic narrative to change 
stakeholders’ negative perceptions emanating from oil spills environmental crisis linked to 
corporate operations. As such, the crisis-ridden companies would use narratives to shape 
their stakeholders’ perceptions on the crisis event and weaken other competing narratives 
from external stakeholders (Higgins and Walker, 2012). With sensegiving narratives acting as 
signals, companies can employ narratives in a blame game to change or influence the 
perceptions and understanding of their audience (Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). Given the 
fact that “sensegiving signals are, by their very nature, interpretive” (Levine Daniel and 
Eckerd, 2019, p. 218), we enlist blame avoidance defensive behaviours to explore corporate 
sensegiving in relation to the causes of oil spills in Nigeria. 
3.2 Defensive behaviours
Investors (and generally other stakeholders) will adversely react towards a company 
accused of negative environmental behaviour by external media if the alternative narratives 
(by those media) are reasonably credible (Carberry et al., 2018). When companies are faced 
with events that trigger negative perceptions from stakeholders, they are under pressure to 
use persuasive narratives to manage their audience’s perceptions (Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 
2012; Boiral, 2013; Botes and Samkin, 2013; Higgins and Walker, 2012; Diouf and Boiral, 
2017). Corporate environmental narratives are potent strategic persuasive tools to 
influencing the perceptions of corporate stakeholders in a specific direction (Higgins and 
Walker, 2012). This is visible where companies have come under stakeholders’ criticisms over 
a range of perceived social and environmental breaches, especially when such incidents are 
unabated. However, corporate stakeholders may perceive independent third-party narratives 
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on the environmental breaches more credible and less self-interested than corporate self-
reports (Du and Vieira, 2012). It thus becomes incumbent on the companies to give credibly 
appealing narratives to their audience by using multiple evidences to support their claims. 
The reasonableness and logicality of such narratives can weaken alternative narratives 
(Higgins and Walker, 2012).    Negative corporate incidents naturally provoke negative public 
reactions, thereby putting the companies under pressure to mobilise defensive accounts as 
strategic tools to avoid blame and favourably alter stakeholders’ perceptions.  Given this 
context, the allegedly blameworthy companies are incentivised to give a sense that 
apparently absolves themselves of blame. As such, we find Ashforth and Lee’s (1990) blame 
avoidance defensive behaviours, particularly after-the-fact blame avoidance lens, useful in 
understanding the corporate narratives on the causes of oil spills in Nigeria, thus giving sense 
to stakeholders that the companies are competent and non-negligent in upholding 
environmental integrity.  
According to Ashforth and Lee (1990, p. 626), to manage the “impression of 
competence and worth often involves the avoidance of blame for actual or anticipated 
negative outcomes.” In the context of oil spill incidents in the Niger Delta, the related 
corporate narratives are after-the-fact narratives in that they are couched after oil spill 
incidents to explain their causes. As such, three elements of blame avoidance concepts by 
(Ashforth and Lee, 1990) will help us understand the nuances of corporate persuasive 
narratives of the causes of oil spill incidents. These concepts are namely, scapegoating, 
justifying and misrepresenting (Ashforth and Lee, 1990). Scapegoating involves “the 
assignment of blame for a negative outcome to an external factor(s) which is not entirely (or 
not at all) blameworthy” (Ashforth and Lee, 1990, p. 628). The actor provides an account that 
the cause of the negative outcome is known and deserves to be blamed. For example, when 
oil spills are attributed to sabotage, it means they are caused by external parties and so those 
parties are to blame rather than the company whose operation is linked to the event. 
Scapegoating evokes protection of self-image in that the actor feels handicapped in the given 
circumstance with a view to escaping accountability.  
Another concept of blame avoidance is misrepresenting.   Misrepresenting occurs 
when an actor engages in manipulating, obfuscating, distorting or embellishing information 
to avoid blame. Such tendencies are sustained in an ambiguity situation where an outcome 
can originate from multiple sources. Because of the ambiguity surrounding the causes of 
negative incidents such as the oil spills linked to corporate activities, a corporate actor may 
be motivated to give them self-serving interpretations. Lastly, another blame avoidance 
concept is justifying. According to Ashforth and Lee (1990), justifying follows the narrative 
pattern to minimize one’s responsibility for certain events linked to one’s activities or 
downplay the severity and consequences of the events. By implication, the actor considers 
the criteria used by others to judge the circumstance as inappropriate. A strand of justifying 
relates to using an appeal to authority to legitimise claims (Bradford and Garrett, 1995; Eweje 
and Wu, 2010). In relation to oil spill incidents, this would mean from corporate perspective 
that those who linked the major cause of oil spills to corporate negligence have used wrong 
methodology to reach their conclusion. Justifying potentially thrives where the actual cause 
of oil spills is surrounded by ambiguity, which equally accords foothold to misrepresentation. 
4 Data and methods     
This paper is a case study that examines how oil MNCs in Nigeria adopt defensive 
persuasive narratives to give sense to stakeholders over the causes of oil spills. The paper 
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draws primarily on the relevant narratives by the companies and stakeholders given the 
frequency of oil spills in Nigeria (Table 1)[1]. The study is a longitudinal case study covering a 
10-year period between 2006 – 2015. A longitudinal case study is adopted because of the 
perennial nature of the oil spill incidents unlike the one-off Exxon Valdez and BP Gulf of 
Mexico incidents. The period covered coincided with when the National Oil Spill Detection 
and Response Agency [NOSDRA] Act was enacted in 2006 partly as a reactive law to public 
agitations over the menace of oil spills. Beyond the enactment of the NOSDRA Act, this period 
also coincided with increasing stakeholder criticisms of the MNCs over oil spills, including 
counter allegations between the MNCs and the Nigerian government over the masterminds 
of sabotage and oil thefts. We focused on the big-five oil MNCs (Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, 
Shell [operating as Shell Petroleum Development Company – SPDC] and Total) because of 
their visible operations and widespread oil spills in Nigeria.  We analysed their corporate 
documents (Table 2) comprising annual sustainability/CSR reports between 2006–2015[2], 
relevant accessible reports published by their Nigerian operations, and other relevant 
information on their websites (Livonen, 2018).   
[Insert Table 1]
[Insert Table 2]
Given the acute stakeholder criticisms trailing oil spill incidents in Nigeria, we 
considered the imperativeness of multiple perspectives by analysing a combination of 
corporate self-reports, independent external accounts and interviews. Twenty stakeholder 
interviews in English were conducted between January and March 2012, which included 
seven environmental and community development NGOs [NGO 1 – NGO 7], ten community 
members from Rivers and Beyelsa States in the Niger Delta [CommStake 1 – CommStake 10], 
and three oil/gas and environmental legal experts [LegExp 1 – LegExp 3]. The community 
members were chosen because their communities had experienced oil spills and were 
involved in community leadership. A cap at ten participants was considered appropriate as 
each additional interview was consistent with the previous – a point of saturation (Guest et 
al., 2006). Semi-structured interviews provide an opportunity for an in-depth understanding 
of a phenomenon (Moll et al., 2006) in a flexible manner that allows the participants to 
express themselves naturally (Parker, 2003), thereby generating data to compare corporate 
claims (Lauwo et al., 2016). Corporate employees would have been interviewed for further 
insight had management given access and support (Laine et al., 2017). Data from interviews 
and the other external sources was used to compare, contrast and/or critique the corporate 
narratives. The independent external accounts include news media publications and 
publications by NGOs. News media publications (including broadsheet papers and business 
news) on oil spills were obtained via Factiva and Google search covering the period of 2006-
2015, resulting in the selection of 105 news items. We used ‘oil spill in Nigeria’ and ‘oil spill in 
the Niger Delta’ as key phrases to achieve the specific and desired results. Stakeholders 
narratives – news items, publications and interviews – were analysed as cross-references to 
the corporate narratives (Adams, 2004; Dey et al., 2011).  
On the analysis of the causes of oil spills, we read the corporate reports to identify the 
narratives relating to Nigeria and closely read the relevant texts to identify the causes 
attributed to oil spill incidents. Similarly, we examined the interviews and external 
documentary narratives to decipher how the external stakeholders framed the causes of oil 
spills in Nigeria. We adopted an iterative approach of analysis between the data and the 
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themes that emerged (Arora and Lodhia, 2017) and linked them back to the blame avoidance 
concepts reflecting the senses the companies gave in seeking to appeal to the sensibilities of 
stakeholders (Ashforth and Lee, 1990). Hence, we first identified the key empirical themes 
that emerged from the data in relation to the causes of oil spill incidents and then mapped 
them onto the blame avoidance concepts of scapegoating, misrepresenting, and justifying 
(Ashforth and Lee, 1990). We mapped each theme onto the blame avoidance concept it fitted 
best with by gauging how those themes and concepts reflected the sense the companies 
sought to give to their audience. The researchers individually carried out the thematic 
mappings, then compared notes, and discussed and resolved the arisen minor discrepancies 
(Arora and Lodhia, 2017; Laine et al., 2017). However, without prejudice to the mapping 
based on best fit, we are aware that these themes may not be mutually exclusive to the blame 
avoidance concepts they are assigned. For example, sabotage can be a form of 
misrepresentation, while the way the MNCs present corrosion narrative can be a form of 
scapegoating.
5 Analysis of empirical evidence  
Oil spills, particularly their cause, occupy a prominent space in the public scrutiny of 
the activities of the oil MNCs operating in Nigeria (Denedo et al., 2018; Egbon et al., 2018; 
Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). This is partly due to the magnitude of the oil spills, the MNCs 
linked to them, and the ambiguity surrounding the spills compared to other pollution such as 
gas flaring and waste discharges. While the cause of gas flaring can be directly linked to the 
MNCs, oil spills “are much more difficult to resolve, as the issue is fraught with the politics of 
scams, sabotage, theft and genuine grievance (European Parliament, 2011, p. 18). Given the 
negative perceptions stakeholders can form on the companies implicated in the perennial oil 
spills (Amir et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2014; Heflin and Wallace, 2017), those companies are 
under pressure to give sense through persuasive narratives to alter the negative perceptions 
towards them (see Boiral, 2013; Botes and Samkin, 2013; Detzen and Hoffman, 2018; Pupovac 
and Moerman, 2017).   The empirical findings are now presented as follows.
5.1 Scapegoating: Sabotage as the cause of most oil spills
Oil spills attributed to sabotage are deemed to be caused by third parties and so are 
outside corporate control. Sabotage is strikingly important for oil companies in Nigeria as any 
company implicated in oil spills risks huge compensation liability to victims if the latter can 
establish that sabotage caused the oil spills. Corporate narratives from different sources have 
cited sabotage as the major cause of oil spills in Nigeria, which have apparently made other 
stakeholders to use the sabotage narrative as a reference point in framing their (counter-
)arguments. Chevron’s CSR reports for 2006 to 2015 did not mention oil spills in Nigeria. 
Moreover, Chevron Nigeria Limited[3] made no disclosures about oil spills in its 2010 and 
2012 CSR reports, except in its 2010 CSR report [p. 22] where it mentioned that the company 
had outstanding environmental performance in relation to spill outside sabotage. It was not 
discernible from ExxonMobil's Corporate Citizenship Reports for 2006-2015 that most spills 
resulted from sabotage as it did not make country-specific oil spills disclosures attributable to 
its Nigeria’s operation. However, in media reports, ExxonMobil attributed the cause of some 
oil spills it contained and cleaned up to sabotage [Platts Commodity News, 2012; Sahara 
Reporters, 2012]. But Eni, Shell and Total explicitly argued that most of the oil spills from their 
Niger Delta facilities resulted from sabotage. For example, 
 “In Nigeria there continue to be sabotages and thefts which in the last 4 years have 
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resulted in … an average of 300 incidents per year (284 in 2014).” [Eni 2014, pp. 59-
60; cf. Eni 2011, p. 42; 2015, p. 38]. 
 “The great majority of oil spills in Nigeria are the result of sabotage or are caused 
when thieves drill into pipelines or damage wellhead equipment to steal oil … such 
spills … accounting for 98% of total Spdc spills volume” [Shell 2009, p. 22; cf. Shell 
2010, p. 19, 30; Shell Nigeria 2011a, 2011b]
News media also reported corporate allegation of sabotage. For example, according 
to Associated Press (9 July 2012), Eni blamed sabotage for the spill that occurred on its 
Nembe-Obama Pipeline. While corporate narratives generally attributed the oil spills in the 
Niger Delta to sabotage, other stakeholders have countered the sabotage narratives as 
follows: 
“There was an incident [spill] that happened in this community last year [2011], I … 
took my bike and I got to the place…. Then few hours later the Agip people came. As 
soon as the Hilux [vehicle] just stopped, the man had not even come down, he said 
this one is sabotage” [CommStake 1]
 
“Shell looks to blame others based on investigation reports that, in some cases, 
amount to nothing more than dodgy dossiers … Shell has made some improvements 
to its investigation reports since 2011, including the addition of images of oil spills on 
its corporate website. But serious flaws remain, including weaknesses in the 
underlying evidence used to attribute spills to sabotage” [Channels Television, 7 
November 2013]
“In a statement signed by the Chairman Senate Committee on Environment Senator 
Bukola Saraki … there have been media reports of two oil spills within the precincts of 
ExxonMobil Nigeria operations in Akwa Ibom state. He said there is a growing 
impression today that majority of the spills are the result of sabotage. However, with 
the recent spills happening deep offshore, it is bec ming evident that there is more to 
this than meets the eye” [Legal Oil, 2012; see also Channels Television, 24 December 
2012]
The above-mentioned doubt expressed by Senator Bukola Saraki about onshore and 
offshore oil spills is apparently shared by one of the interviewed legal experts who claimed 
that: 
“The oil companies have never ever accepted spill is caused by them; they always say 
it is [caused by] sabotage, especially if it is onshore. They don’t ever. But for offshore 
they can agree because they know that nobody could get there. But anything onshore, 
it is sabotage” [LegExp 3]
Furthermore, stakeholders considered oil companies’ sabotage allegation as an 
excuse to avoid accountability and payment of compensation to victims of oil spills because 
of the legal incentives underpinning the claim. Various stakeholders have linked corporate 
allegation of sabotage with compensation avoidance as follows: 
“When corporations talk of sabotage, they are hiding certain facts. One, they are 
unable to police their oil facilities and as a result they are blaming third parties. So the 
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action of the third party cannot be made as the action of the main victim. In other 
words, if oil is spilled on a farm by a third party, what relationship has that to do with 
the victim? The victim is not the third party. You can see that it is a matter of 
convenience for the oil companies to claim sabotage in order to evade responsibility 
and accountability … But they choose to hide under the claim of sabotage to evade 
payment of compensation and clean up” [NGO 2] 
“From January to February [2012], we have already recorded about 8 to 9 pollution 
[oil spills] and none is sabotage. Although none is sabotage, none will be paid [attract 
compensation]” [CommStake 5]
Oil companies risk huge compensation payment for oil spills attributed to them if they 
are found guilty of causing such oil spills according to the following narrative: 
“Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company, SNEPCO, was, yesterday, ordered 
by Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA, and the National Oil 
Spill Response and Emergency Agency, NOSREA, to pay a total of $11.5 billion, about 
N1.84 trillion, as fines and compensation for the 2011 Bonga oil spill incident” (All 
Africa, 30 January 2014]    
Hence, the stakeholders argue that the sabotage claim is a protective cover for the oil 
companies to evade paying compensation to victims of oil spills particularly because the 
Nigerian law disapproves compensation payment for sabotage-induced oil spills [Amnesty 
International, 2009, p. 17]. Shell also stresses this fact that:
 “Where the investigation shows that the spill was within SPDC’s control to prevent, 
SPDC negotiates compensation with the affected landowners. In 2010, SPDC paid 
more than $1.7 million in compensation. Nigerian law does not require payment of 
compensation in cases of sabotage” [Shell Nigeria 2011c, p. 2] 
While the Nigerian law exempts the oil companies from paying compensation to the 
victims of sabotage-induced oil spills, it confers additional advantage on the companies by 
placing the burden of proof of non-sabotage on the victims (Adewale, 1989). Even with proofs 
beyond reasonable doubt, stakeholders remain cynical that the MNCs will capitalise on the 
weak and slow legal system to frustrate justice and avoid paying compensation (Frynas, 2001; 
Milieudefensie, 2015; Omeje, 2006).  The following narratives corroborate such stakeholders’ 
cynicism. 
“Some leaders of the communities had in 1983, dragged the oil company before a High 
Court... In a judgment it delivered on May 27, 1997, … the High Court adjudged the 
matter in favour of the communities. Dissatisfied with the judgment, Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited took the matter before the Court of Appeal 
in Benin City. In a verdict it gave on May 22, 2000, the appellate court, affirmed the 
decision of the trial court and directed the company to immediately pay compensation 
to the four communities. Determined not to pay the communities, the oil company 
approached the Supreme Court, praying it to set aside the concurrent judgements of 
the two lower courts. Nevertheless, delivering judgment on the matter yesterday, a 
five-man panel of Justices of the apex court, led by Justice John Fabiyi, dismissed the 
appeal as grossly lacking in merit” [The Vanguard, 6 June 2015]   
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 “What Agip does sometimes is that when spill occurs, they will always call them 
sabotage. There was a case of a spill like that too in 2006, two spills occurred at the 
same time, they came with the JIV and they gave their report as equipment failure. 
The community people were there. Government representatives were there. Agip 
people were there … They said it was equipment failure. But on their way going back, 
they agreed among themselves and changed it that it was sabotage. And no 
compensation was paid even till today [2012]” [CommStake 10]
5.2 Misrepresenting: Corrosion/equipment failure causes only minimal oil spills
Corrosion narrative is another corporate account on the source of oil spills in Nigeria, 
which is equally highly disputed by stakeholders like the sabotage narrative as it represents 
the flip side of sabotage. Corrosion is inversely related to sabotage because attributing most 
oil spills to sabotage means less oil spills are caused by corrosion. Inaccuracy associated with 
such corporate attribution, whether intentionally or unintentionally, risked 
misrepresentation of facts. Given corporate claims that most oil spill incidents emanate from 
sabotage, the companies are naturally claiming that corrosion contributes only minimally to 
the oil spills in Nigeria. By implication, the companies are alleging that alternative claims that 
attribute most oil spill incidents to corrosion are misrepresentations of fact. Some corporate 
corrosion narratives are:  
“Although we had no pollution incidents to report in 2010, we experienced 20 
between 2006 and 2009 on our only operated onshore project, OML 58. Fifteen were 
caused by acts of vandalism [sabotage] and five occurred as a result of technical 
incidents (corrosion or accidents)” [Total 2010, p. 57]
 “The major oil spills are caused by acts of sabotage or terrorism. Further causes may 
be attributed to operating problems (collisions, seal failure etc.) and corrosion or 
breaks [Eni 2006, p. 54]
However, stakeholders allege that most oil spills emanate from corrosion rather than 
sabotage due to the aged oil pipelines, but this point is apparently suppressed in the 
corporate narratives. The companies are silent on their aged pipelines conveying high 
pressure crude oil in the region. Whereas the MNCs affirmed that corrosion minimally caused 
the oil spills, stakeholders argued that it caused most of the spills because of the over-aged 
pipelines. For example, an independent investigation done by a prominent Nigerian 
newspaper, The Nations, suggests that not less than 50% of oil spills are caused by corrosion 
due to the aged pipelines [Legal Oil, 2010]. Despite the stakeholders’ claims about the aged 
pipelines [see Amnesty International, 2009, 2013; Christian Aid, 2004; Steiner, 2010], the 
companies are silent about them when they mention equipment failure or corrosion. The 
following narratives also indict the companies of cover-ups on their ageing pipelines in the 
Niger Delta.
“By 1994 Shell privately admitted that SPDC had ageing and polluting infrastructure 
that was “unacceptable.” One document noted, “Key aspects of the past 
environmental practices of the SPDC operation also fall short of current standards and 
leave a significant legacy of problems to be resolved.” [Stockman et al., 2009, p. 17]  
“Shell failed to act on its own internal advice to replace a 30-year-old pipeline years 
before it wreaked havoc on the Niger Delta by rupturing and spilling thousands of 
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barrels of oil into the area, according to court documents. The two giant spills, in 2008, 
affected about 35 square miles of southern Nigeria, including sensitive mangroves, 
and ruined the livelihoods of up to 15,000 villagers in Bodo in Ogoniland, who are 
suing the company in London in a case due to start in May[4].” [The Independent, 13 
November 2014]
Although all the MNCs failed to mention the life cycle of their pipelines, the massive 
annual pipeline replacement programmes of the oil companies appear to allude to 
stakeholders’ claims about the companies’ ageing pipelines. 
“Stopping spills under its direct control is a key priority for SPDC. In 2011, work to 
maintain and replace pipelines and other infrastructure continued. In the past three 
years, SPDC has replaced about 400 km of pipeline, and work continues to replace 
further pipelines.” [Shell, 2011, p. 19]
“A key priority for SPDC is to achieve its goal of no operational spills. In 2013, it 
continued work to maintain and replace pipelines and other infrastructure and, in the 
past three years, SPDC has replaced around 770 km of pipeline.” [Shell 2013, p. 23]
“To reduce the number of operational spills, the SPDC JV continues to work to 
maintain and replace sections of pipeline and other infrastructure, installing 132 km 
of new pipeline during the year.” [Shell 2014, p. 36]
While pipeline replacement programme is commendable as it can eliminate corrosion-
induced oil spills, the narrative indirectly alludes to ageing pipelines with implications for 
corrosion and oil spills. Such a subtle approach to reporting is a strategic use of narrative to 
shape cognitive bias and promote a particular worldview (Drori and Ellis, 2011) to reflect what 
appeals to the audience (Rouleau, 2005).  
Interviewees also expressed their concerns over the integrity of oil pipelines in the 
Niger Delta. As such, they have argued that most of the oil spills were caused by ageing 
pipelines, which are susceptible to corrosion and leakages according to the following 
narratives.  
“You see, under pipeline integrity, a pipeline ought not to be more than 25 or 30 years 
old, but most of our pipelines are over 50 years old. So what do you think about that? 
Are they not breaking up by themselves? They are breaking up by themselves because 
the pressure inside is much. They cannot say spills are caused by sabotage, but what 
they say is a cooked-up excuse” [NGO 3]
“You know the pipeline that conveys oil to the Trans-Niger [terminal] is steadily 
flowing. And look at the age of the pipeline … it is over-aged and when it spills it just 
spills like that” [CommStake 3]
“All oil spills are not sabotage. They also arise as a result of negligence of these oil 
companies because some of these pipes have been on the ground for a period of 50, 
60 years. They are now corrosive.” [LegExp 3]
5.3 Justifying: Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) as a collaborative decision
In seeking to make the allegation of sabotage persuasive to corporate audience, the 
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companies mobilise the JIV narrative to justify their sabotage claims. Justifying aims at 
demonstrating that the companies relied on credible evidence to reach the sabotage 
conclusion, thereby subordinating stakeholders’ claims as unsupported by evidence. JIV 
serves that purpose. JIV supposedly provides multi-stakeholders evidence-based findings and 
decisions on the causes of oil spills. The JIV narrative thus assumes that the alleged causes of 
oil spills are determined through the JIV as an independent and objective mechanism as 
presented below: 
“When an oil spill occurs, a joint investigation team visits the site as quickly as possible 
to establish the cause and volume of the spill. The team is led by SPDC, and includes 
representatives of the regulatory bodies and the Ministry of Environment. The police, 
state government officials and impacted communities are also invited to attend the 
visit” [Shell Nigeria 2011d, pp. 1-2; cf. Shell 2013, p. 23] 
Eni also considered the JIV as a mechanism for working with local authorities and 
communities’ representative to promote joint investigation due to the allegedly alarming rate 
of sabotage [Eni 2006, p. 96] and to determine the causes of oil spills [Eni 2009, p. 75]. The 
other MNCs did not talk about JIV exercise. By drawing public attention to the JIV, the 
companies are apparently brandishing a showmanship of stakeholder collaborative decisions.  
It portrays an image of transparency and collective actions involving corporate-stakeholder 
joint determination of the causes of the oil spills. As such, the JIV narrative seeks to justify the 
credibility of corporate claims that most of the oil spills are caused by sabotage and less by 
corrosion or equipment failures. In fact, regulation prescribes a JIV whenever oil spills occur 
and provides for a joint investigation within 24 hours when oil spills occur [EGASPIN, 2002]. 
Whereas the MNCs attach credibility to the JIV with its outcomes, stakeholders discredit the 
JIV exercise because of corporate control over it as the regulators overseeing the exercise 
depend on the companies for JIV logistics (see Babatunde, 2020; UNEP, 2011). Stakeholders 
not only perceive the action as inappropriate for independence [UNEP, 2011], but also believe 
it compromises the credibility of the investigation as the process risks corporate control 
[Amnesty International, 2009; Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility [ECCR], 2010]. 
Interviewees also share similar concern about the credibility of the JIV exercise: 
What Agip does sometimes is that when spill occurs, they will always call them 
sabotage. There was a case of a spill … in 2006, two spills occurred at the same time, 
they came with the JIV and they gave their report as equipment failure. The 
community people, Government and Agip representatives were there.  They said it 
was equipment failure, but they later claimed it was sabotage. And no compensation 
was paid even till today.” [CommStake 5]
“What they do is that they will just bring a plain paper and ask you to sign and they 
will tell you that they can’t fill their report in the field and that when they get to the 
office they will collate [complete] the report.  … Some [community] boys who are not 
grounded [ignorant], when they [MNCs] find [give] them a little thing [incentive] they 
will sign it.” [CommStake 3]  
The view of corporations seeking to manipulate the JIV outcome is also shared by 
some other stakeholders who accused the MNCs of hijacking the JIV process to manipulate 
its outcomes [e.g., NGO 3; Amnesty International, 2013].  For example, the narrative below 
alleges Shell’s attempt to comprise a JIV report:  
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“Amnesty International also claimed to have secretly filmed video of an investigation 
showing how officials from Shell and the regulator tried to subvert the evidence by 
persuading community members on the investigation team not to attribute the cause 
to equipment failure.” [Channels Television, 2013]
Similarly, a State Commissioner in the Niger Delta have also called to question the 
credibility of the JIV process in the following narrative: 
“Mr. Wills, the Bayelsa Commissioner for Environment, noted that the state 
government had resolved to overhaul the entire spills and pollution response process. 
“We have noted that the joint investigation procedure had not achieved the desired 
result and we are resolved to follow up the entire process in detail. Our technical staff 
have been so directed to be fully involved,” said the commissioner” [Sahara Reporters, 
15 March 2015]
However, corporate view on the credibility of the JIV process and outcomes is further 
buttressed by the alleged inclusion of independent NGO group in all JIV exercises. For 
example:
“SPDC continued to work with communities and civil society to build greater trust in 
spill response and clean-up processes. Representatives of the principal NGO coalition 
in the Niger Delta, called the National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the 
Niger Delta (NACGOND), are invited to join all Joint Investigation Visits. These visits 
assess the cause and extent of oil spills” [Shell 2014, p. 37].
Whereas the above claim potentially increases the JIV’s credibility, it is unclear 
whether the NGO coalition indeed attend all the exercises upon invitations. Given that Shell’s 
2014 invitation claim preceded the representation made in 2015 by the Bayelsa 
Commissioner for Environment, it could be inferred that the JIV credibility concerns were still 
unresolved. 
6 Discussion of findings
This paper was motivated to explore how the big-five MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry 
deployed strategic narratives on the causes of oil spills as signals to induce the favourable 
perceptions of their audience, particularly, their investors. The empirical analysis has 
demonstrated how corporate narratives have been strategically framed around blame 
avoidance to give sense to the corporate audience, or influence their perceptions, particularly 
with evidence that appears transparent and persuasive. Since the investors of the case 
companies are detached from the companies’ operations, the companies perceive to use 
corporate narratives as strategic instruments to meet their stakeholders’ information needs 
with respect to crisis incidents – oil spills in this context (Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). The 
companies have used narratives as signals to give sense to and create meaning for their 
audience, thereby supporting the view of sensegiving as “the symbolic constructions used to 
create meaning for others” (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 446) and a signalling instrument 
“intended to supplant or re-frame existing conceptions” (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 439). 
Our findings showed that the case companies mobilised blamed avoidance narratives in 
reframing the causes of oil spill incidents in Nigeria. While these framings (scapegoating, 
misrepresenting and justifying) are aimed at influencing the perceptions of the audience, the 
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extent they transparently portray the crisis reality and the discharge of the related 
accountability remains doubtful. 
Our empirical analysis showed that the MNCs attributed the cause of most oil spills in 
Nigeria to sabotage (the actions of third parties). This represents a scapegoating phenomenon 
in that it shifts blame from the companies to third parties (Ashforth and Lee, 1990). However, 
this view has been criticised by other stakeholders who have considered the corporate claims 
as exaggerations to evade payment of compensation to the victims of oil spills. As such, the 
stakeholders believed that most of the oil spills were caused by corrosion based on the 
evidence of over-aged pipelines, while the companies alleged that only a minimal amount of 
oil spills emanated from corrosion or equipment failures. Ageing pipelines have been linked 
to internal and external corrosion and numerous oil spills in Nigeria (see Lilly et al., 2007). 
Although the companies did not refute the aged pipeline allegation, they maintained silence 
on it. But Shell’s annual replacement of significant portions of its pipelines indirectly 
confirmed stakeholders’ allegation of critical ageing pipelines and hence corrosion. 
Thus, corrosion narratives are apparently underpinned by the notion of 
misrepresenting, obfuscating or suppressing facts. Our empirical analysis considered 
misrepresenting in the context of oil spills as deriving broadly from the MNCs potentially 
misclassifying corrosion as an insignificant cause of oil spills to favourably influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions. Both the MNCs and stakeholders agreed that sabotage have 
caused oil spills in Nigeria, but they disagreed on the ground of sabotage-corrosion 
disproportionate classification.  For example, the revelations from Amnesty International’s 
commissioned scientific investigations into the causes of several spills in the Niger Delta and 
Amnesty International’s conversations with the oil companies suggest a high degree of 
misclassification of corrosion-induced oil spills as sabotage-induced (see Amnesty 
International, 2013). Such a disproportionate classification that most oil spills are caused by 
sabotage absolves the oil companies of potential liability to oil spills’ victims (Adewale, 1989), 
which is further enhanced by the likelihood that the Nigerian courts would endorse the MNCs’ 
allegations (Frynas, 1999).
In addition to mobilising scapegoating (sabotage) and misrepresenting (corrosion) 
blame avoidance narratives to account for the causes of oil spills in Nigeria, the companies 
adopted justifying (JIV) blame avoidance narrative to reinforce their sabotage-corrosion 
claims. Justifying potentially thrives where the actual cause of the oil spills is surrounded by 
ambiguity. As Ashforth and Lee (1990) argue, justifying follows the narrative pattern to 
minimize one’s responsibility for certain events linked to one’s activities or downplay the 
severity and consequences of the events. By implication, the actor considers the criteria 
others used to judge the circumstance as inappropriate and draws on appeal to authority to 
legitimise claims (Bradford and Garrett, 1995; Eweje and Wu, 2010). This suggests that those 
who linked the major cause of the oil spill incidents to corporate negligence (corrosion) rather 
than sabotage have used wrong methodology to reach their conclusion. So, the companies 
justified their sabotage-corrosion claims using the JIV narrative to demonstrate that the 
conclusion that oil spills emanated from sabotage or corrosion was collaboratively 
determined by the companies and other stakeholders. Nonetheless, the images of credibility 
and collective decision on the causes of the oil spills created by the corporate narratives may 
not represent the reality and as such may bias transparency (Boiral, 2013).
Whereas the MNCs created the impression that they objectively determined the 
causes of oil spills through JIV architecture, other empirical evidence portrayed the JIV 
process as lacking in credibility. In framing sabotage as a persuasive narrative, the companies 
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have alluded to the JIV as a multi-stakeholder exercise for assessing the causes and severity 
of oil spills in Nigeria, albeit stakeholders’ concern about its corporate capture. Besides 
serving as a mechanism for determining the causes of oil spills, the JIV serves as an instrument 
the companies use to determine whether they are liable to compensate the victims of oil 
spills. Sabotage and corrosion have implications for corporate liability and compensation 
payments to victims of oil spills as spills attributed to sabotage attract no compensation 
payme t, while the law also places the burden of proof on the victims of the oil spills. With 
the law putting the burden of proof on the victims of oil spills to prove that the spills for which 
they are seeking compensation did not arise from sabotage (Adewale, 1989) coupled with the 
involving technicalities and litigation process (Frynas, 1999; Milieudefensie, 2015), 
stakeholders believed that the oil companies are thus incentivised to use sabotage as a matter 
of convenience to avoid compensation liabilities. This finding shows the disproportionate 
convenience for the companies to allege sabotage than corrosion as the major cause of oil 
spills by the symbolic credibility they attach to the JIV exercise, while the law that puts the 
burden of proof on the oil spills’ victims to prove that the spills were not caused by sabotage 
further complicated the issue. Despite the risk of misclassifying the causes of oil spills, the 
Nigerian law exempts the companies from paying compensation to the victims of alleged 
sabotage-induced oil spills. This syncs with the commentaries that Nigeria lacks the regulatory 
power to compel oil MNCs to address environmental problems arising from their operations 
(Nwoke, 2016).
This macro-contextual factor further complicated and obscured the transparent 
discharge of accountability because of the positive incentive it created for the companies to 
allege that most spills were caused by sabotage. Hence, this raises the need for future 
investigation into how socio-political contextual dynamics complicate corporate 
accountability. From the empirical data, the case companies strategically framed blame 
avoidance narratives that apparently appeal to their investing audience by drawing on the 
available loopholes within the complex social contexts from which those narratives derived 
(Botes and Samkin, 2013; Pupovac and Moerman, 2017). Consequently, the socio-political 
dynamics and complexities within a social context can make companies to continue their 
operations with impunity amid enormous perennial pollution generated by their operations. 
In contrast, one-off oil spill incidents such as the Exxon Valdez and BP Gulf of Mexico oil spills 
in the US instigated public outcries that engendered corporate apologies and reassuring 
commitments to avert future reoccurrences (see Botes and Samkin, 2013; Wehmeier and 
Schultz, 2011).  
7. Conclusion 
This case study on corporate accountability with respect to oil spill incidents in Nigeria 
has examined how the oil MNCs adopted defensive behaviours (blame avo dance narratives) 
to give sense to their stakeholders over the causes of oil spills. The empirical analysis has 
shown how the corporations gave sense to their audience by invoking scapegoating blame 
avoidance narrative in attributing the cause of most oil spills in Nigeria to the actions of 
outsiders (sabotage), despite potentially misclassifying the sabotage-corrosion dichotomy. 
The corporations reinforced their stance through justifying narrative, suggesting that the 
causes of the oil spills were jointly determined by multi-stakeholders, thus portraying 
corporate account as transparent, credible and objective. While stakeholders believed that 
sabotage also caused oil spills in Nigeria, they argued that most of the oil spills emanated from 
corrosion due to the ageing pipelines which are highly susceptible to corrosion. They further 
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argued that the MNCs have been attributing most oil spills to sabotage to avoid paying 
compensation to oil spill victims because the law exempts the companies from paying them 
compensation for spills allegedly caused by sabotage. With the law permitting payment of 
compensation to only the victims of non-sabotage-induced oil spills alongside placing the 
burden of proof on those victims, the MNCs are legally incentivised to attribute most oil spills 
to sabotage. Serious accountability tension is thus created, not only because the law tasks the 
oil spill victims (usually poor community members) to prove the cause of the pollution but 
also even when it is proven beyond reasonable doubt the companies still uses their influence 
to frustrate justice. The policy implication of this is that accountability would be best served 
when the MNCs are tasked both with the burden of proof and a responsibility to demonstrate 
their transparency in preventing oil spills, including those caused by sabotage. 
Our study has provided some nuanced insights into the accountability practices of 
environmentally sensitive industries in developing economies – specifically Nigeria, where the 
environmental pollution from oil operations is both perennial and pervasive. It contributed to 
the wider literature of corporate accountability by providing insights into how organisations 
operating in a sensitive and complex social context engage in sensegiving by deploying blame 
avoidance narratives to influence stakeholders’ perceptions favourably towards themselves 
despite the persistent environmental pollution linked to their operations. The paper also 
complemented studies on corporate impression management as sengegiving is construed as 
a tactic of impression management (van Halderen et al., 2016). Many prior studies have 
examined a single environmental incident and how the implicated companies deployed 
narratives to alter the perceptions of their audience (Beelitz and Merkl-Davies; Botes and 
Samkin, 2013; Ruffing, 2007; Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012). Pupovac and Moerman 
(2017) equally demonstrated how Shell deployed rhetorical narratives as powerful 
instruments to persuade its audience about its responsiveness and transparency with respect 
to the oil spill incidents linked to its operation in Nigeria. Our paper provided further insight 
on the role of narratives within the same messy context by exploring how the big-five oil 
MNCs (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, Shell and Total) strategically used blame avoidance 
defensive narratives to alter stakeholders’ perceptions on the causes of oil spills in Nigeria.  It 
is thus observable that accounts-giving is not only about satisfying accountability demands, 
but also a sensegiving mode aimed at reframing or redefining existing perceptions. 
By drawing on the SEA reports of the case companies, the paper found the corporate 
narratives helpful in gaining further insight into how corporations strategically frame 
persuasive narratives when faced with legitimacy-threatening situations so they not only 
avoid negative reactions from their investors but also continue to enjoy their support. For 
example, despite the perennial oil spills linked to the MNCs’ operations in Nigeria and the 
public outcries, the companies have yet to receive damning consequences from their 
investing community over the pollution (Bovens, 2007). As the companies used narratives to 
give sense to their perceived salient stakeholders on the reality of oil spill incidents in Nigeria 
(Pupovac and Moerman, 2017), those stakeholders appear to consider the corporate 
narratives persuasive and credible as they continue to support the companies investment 
wise (Carberry et al., 2018). It implies that corporate defensive blame avoidance narratives 
are effective sensegiving signals as they appeared to have favourably influenced the investing 
community’s perceptions towards the companies despite the persistent oil-induced 
corporate environmental pollution.   
In addition, the study has provided implicit insight into how powerful audience 
perceive the credibility of corporate narratives over other competing perspectives (Carberry 
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et al., 2018) based on how companies with legitimacy-threatening environmental crisis 
strategically frame narratives to induce the continuous support of the audience. Given the 
complexity and opaqueness of the Nigerian oil industry (Egbon et al., 2018), our findings imply 
that the social complexities, socio-political dynamics, and regulatory laxity in an empirical 
context/country could make corporate narratives on poor environmental outcomes appear 
persuasive and coherent. As such, corporate environmental narratives and actual corporate 
enviro mental practices will almost always remain disproportionate (Cho et al., 2015, 2018; 
Rhee and Lee, 2003). Future studies may look at how the macro institutional, legal and 
political environments interact to influence both the corporate environmental practices of 
companies and the related accountability.  
Endnote
1.  There is no clear-cut data on which company faces higher spills than the others. However, 
Shell has been more on the spotlight than the others. The figure of oil spills reported is 
likely understated as minor spills may have been ignored (European Parliament, 2011). 
Segregating spills by each company is constrained by data access.  
2.  A review of the MNCs’ sustainability/CSR reports in 2016 to 2018 does not reveal any 
materially dissimilar narratives. 
3.  Chevron’s subsidiary operating in Nigeria.
4. In January 2015, Shell quickly settled out of court by agreeing to pay the victims £55m 
    (Leigh Day, 2015).
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2012 844^
2013 522^
2014 1,087^
2015 753^
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Table 2: A summary of reports analysed in the selected MNCs
MNCs Global CSR Subsidiary
CSR & others
Aggregate
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Chevron 10 2 12
Eni 10 0 10
ExxonMobil 10 0 10
Shell 10 7 17
Total 10 4 14
Aggregate 50 13 63
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